on environmental ethics by a professional philosopher (Routley 1973) . 3 The title of his paper asked, "Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental Ethic?" In 1974 John
Passmore, another Australian philosopher, published the first book-length treatment of environmental ethics, Man's Responsibility for Nature. The first American paper on environmental ethics was by Holmes Rolston III (1975) . 3 There was one earlier but largely neglected paper entitled "Ethics and the Beetle" (MacIver 1948) . 4 I have also listed some of the books on religion and the environment following the references.
These lists are incomplete: my point is not. Increasingly we are coming to understand that humans cause environmental problems and that, while some things have gotten better since the 1930s, 1940s, or 1950s, there is still cause for alarm and concern.
This contribution to the Handbook on Ethics in Marketing is for marketers with an environmental or ecological consciousness that are unsure how to talk about the moral importance of the natural environment.
Philosophical Traditions

Confucius in China, Siddhartha Gautama (the Buddha) in India and Socrates in
Greece each lived at about the same time (in what is called the Axial Age, roughly five or six hundred years before the common era (BCE). Each gave rise to a historically important philosophical tradition. 5 One difference between the traditions, the Eastern and the Western is that the Western tradition developed a decidedly individualistic approach to ethics (Gunn 1983) while the others made room for a consideration of the whole.
The Western philosophical tradition is concerned with human beings; indeed, with individual human beings. Only the individual human being has moral status. This position is arrived at by one of two primary routes. One is to claim that only human beings have certain special characteristics, like rationality or the ability to use language.
Since only humans have these characteristics, only humans deserve moral consideration.
A second route is to claim that moral relationships can only exist between reciprocating 5 As in so many things, anthropologists challenge the notion that before the rise of the great philosophical traditions there was no such thing as philosophy or philosophical thinking. See, in particular, Paul Radin's Primitive Man as Philosopher (1927) . 7 utilitarianism and then with Kantianism before coming to this sentimentalist school of ethics.
Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is likely the most familiar ethical theory to marketers because economics is thoroughly utilitarian. Marketing, related as it is to economics, is also thoroughly utilitarian. The utilitarian maxim is well known: "act so as to produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number" (Jeremy Bentham), or, alternatively, "Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness" (John Stuart Mill). In both cases happiness was understood as the presence of pleasure or the absence of pain. Bentham made no distinction between higher or lower pleasures but was concerned with the sheer quantity of pleasure. Thus his quip, "The quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry." Mill was as concerned about qualitative differences in pleasures as he was the quantity of them. His counter quip, "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."
Modern utilitarians refer to preferences and interests rather than pleasure and pain. The goal of human action becomes the maximization of welfare, understood as the maximization of preference satisfaction. People reveal their preferences through their actions and what they overwhelmingly reveal are preferences for goods and services.
Accordingly, the maximization of collective satisfaction, and thereby the maximization of collective happiness, becomes the maximization of consumption. Everything central to the environmentally concerned person-animals, trees, rivers, rocks, forests, ecosystems, geological marvels-are of no value unless they serve our needs. That is a people centered ethic; it is not an environmental or ecological ethic. Lisa
Newton captured this in her observation that no traditional ethic will capture our duties to nature "for the theories were all developed to treat human beings only" (2005, p. 82).
Kant/Rights Theory
The other principal ethical theory is that of Immanuel Kant. Kant argued, contrary to utilitarianism, that consequences are irrelevant to whether an action is good or bad, right or wrong. Kant would have said, Do the right thing and worry not about the consequences; let the chips fall where they may.
But what is the right thing? The rightness of an act is determined by whether the actor can honestly say that he or she would want everyone else to act in that way. If so, the action is right. If not, the action is wrong. The potential or realized consequences of the act are irrelevant.
In Kant's view, rational people will not be prepared to adopt a rule for themselves unless they were prepared to accept it as applicable to and by all people. If I choose to act in a certain way, I must agree that I must allow others to act in a similar manner. We have a duty, an obligation, to act rationally. This has been likened to the Golden Rule: treat others the way you want them to treat you (or, in the negative, do not treat others in ways that you do not want them to treat you). The reciprocity issue can readily be seen here.
Another Kantian approach is that people should never be treated merely as a means to an end but, rather, as having ends of their own. We have ends of our own because we are rational, can think and plan for our own future. Since all else is nonrational, all else can be treated as a means to our end. As philosophers express it, people (rational beings) have intrinsic value (value in and of themselves); all else has instrumental value (value that derives from serving another's end). Or, as I believe it was
Descartes that expressed it, human beings have value; everything else has a price.
To summarize, human beings deserve to be treated morally, which means they deserve to be treated as an end and not merely as a means to an end. Everything elseanimals, trees, rocks, rivers, forests, ecosystems, geological marvels-can be treated as a means to another's end. That end is our end, our purposes.
Implications for Marketers
The implications of this general thrust of traditional ethics for marketers are pretty straightforward. If we are to maximize satisfaction, happiness and pleasure, and if people reveal their preferences, through their actions in the marketplace, as preferences for goods and services (the output of industry), then in pursuing the good and the right, marketers have a duty to satisfy, as a marketing textbook once put it, "peoples' desires for goods and services as they, themselves, define and express those desires" (Stanton 1981) . If environmental concern is central to enough people, if people develop a preference for penguins over popcorn and petroleum, they will express that concern and those preferences through their purchases. Marketers will be listening and paying attention and will accommodate those preferences when, and if, they are expressed-but not before. This approach is woven into the very fabric of marketing theory and practice.
For those marketers with an environmental concern, this is inadequate. Even
Stanton waffled toward the end of that same textbook when he wrote (1981, p. 558),
In considering the marketability of a new product, marketing executives may stop asking, 'Can it be sold.' Instead, they may ask, 'Should it be sold? Is it worth the cost to society?'
As I pointed out before (Benton 1985) , if marketers are to ask should something be sold, it is implied that there exists some criteria, some ethical theory, regarding human and social well-being by which we can justify that assessment. Generally people want that their actions be good and right-that they are ethical. We also want to be able to defend our actions to others. Today any such theory must include not just social well-being but the well-being of the non-human natural environment. To this point there is no theory by which marketers can ask themselves if something should be sold. All they can do, to this point, is refer to the standard refrain that it should be sold if enough people want it and will buy it. We are not to judge of the tastes and preferences of other people.
Extending Mainstream Ethical Theories
Many have argued that the bounds of consideration should and can be extended beyond the human being. They argue that a proper understanding of utilitarianism and rights theory requires expanding the sphere of the morally considerable to include beings other than existing humans. All such efforts attempt to extend the moral community on the same basis by which we ascribe rights to humans.
Suffering
Under the guise of the original pleasure/pain principle, utilitarianism can embrace some parts of the non-human sphere since some animals can and do experience pleasure Moral rights function to protect interests. In order to have rights, an entity must be able to consciously aim at-to think about-its own interests. To do so presupposes at least rudimentary cognitive abilities. We now know that not all non-human animals lack rationality, if by that we mean an ability to solve practical problems in a logical, if rudimentary, way (Griffin 2001; Morell 2013; Wasserman and Zentall 2006; Woods 2010) . Therefore, because they share with us at least some of the characteristics by which we ascribe rights to ourselves they, too, deserve moral consideration. 
Summary and Implications
Because of Singer's (1975) and Regan's (1983) persuasively argued views we now scrutinize factory farming and have eliminated some animal testing. They extended the boundaries of the moral community to include not just humans but all those with at least some of the characteristic by which we ascribe rights to ourselves-the capacity to experience pain or at least some level of cognitive capacity or having an interest in continuing to live. They have drawn attention to their moral right to be free from human induced pain and suffering, and their moral right to life.
Each of these extensions expands the moral community, yet much remains left out because of the necessity of drawing boundaries. In addition, both emphasize, to the exclusion of all else, the individual-the individual person, the individual animal, the individual tree (Gunn 1983 , Marietta 1993 . Left out, even from these extended versions, are species preservation, air and water pollution, and ecosystem integrity-just those things that are centrally important to those with environmental concerns. In none of these extended views are species or ecosystems candidates for moral standing. It is this basic feature of traditional ethics, Varner notes, that "has played a major role in their rejection by many prominent environmental ethicists" (Varner 2001, p. 195) .
Despite these limitations, even these extensions have important implications for marketers and for marketing educators. For example, when conducting an environmental scan it is not enough to consider only the social, economic, technological, competitive and regulatory environments-the now standard elements of the marketing environment.
To assess the opportunities and threats to an organization, marketers must now add, as a new element in the marketing environment, at least some elements in the non-human natural environment. Marketers must not ask simply how the non-human natural environment impacts them or their organization, but how they and their organization impact the living beings that comprise the non-human natural environment. When marketers do that, they may come up with a different answer to the question, "Should it be sold." Marketers might also find that they are not compelled to always take their marching orders from the consumer.
To do this, however, the standard sequence in most marketing textbooks must be revised. The chapter on marketing ethics, which often follows the chapter on conducting a marketing scan, will have to come first. The reasons why marketers should consider the non-human natural environment must be explained before students receive instruction in conducting the marketing scan. And, of course, the standard textbook treatment of marketing ethics will have to be expanded beyond the utilitarian atomistic and chauvinistic social philosophy in which marketing ethics are embedded.
An Evolutionary Approach to Ethics Based on Sentiments
Most Western moral philosophy-utilitarianism, rights theory, social contract theory-accepts our ability to reason is the source and origin of ethics. At some time in the past people decided it was better to establish codes for ethical behavior-to accept a limitation on human freedom-than to continue in the proverbial Hobbesian war of all against all.
The problem with this account of the origin of ethics is that it has the cart before the horse. Our ability to reason cannot possibly have evolved apart from an intensely social context, and such a context-nay, society, itself-cannot possibly have existed in the absence of some moral restraints, some limitations on freedom of action in the so called struggle for existence. Something, civil law or codes of proper conduct, had to already exist to hold the society together. The moral sentiments are both natural and universally distributed among human beings…In other words, like physical features-the placement of the eyes in the critical point biological evolution stopped (or nearly stopped) and cultural evolution took over. The problem is that the archaeological record suggests that such a moment never occurred and that rather than sequential development it was a co-evolutionary development of the biological and the cultural (see Geertz 1973, pp. 61-69 There cannot be fidelity without truth; and this fundamental virtue is not rare between the members of the same tribe…; but to lie to your enemy has rarely been thought a sin, as the history of modern diplomacy too plainly shews [sic].
Darwin concludes (1871, pp. 96-97), actions are regarded by savages, and were probably so regarded by primeval man, as good or bad, solely as they affected in an obvious manner the welfare of the tribe,-not that of the species, nor that of man as an individual member of the tribe.
Hume does not abandon reason; its role is to guide the passions. Reason guides our passions and sentiments in two ways. First, it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something that is the proper object of the passion. Second, it discovers the connections of causes and effects, thereby providing us the means of exerting a passion.
But it is our feelings, our sentiments, which serve as the ultimate foundation of our moral judgments. Distinctions of good and evil, vice and virtue are founded not on reason but upon sentiment. Reason supports ethical behavior by discerning the proper objects of our other-oriented moral sentiments and by discerning the complex relations of cause and effect.
For Hume the condition of humankind in the absence of civilization is not a war of all against all. It is a condition in which people, even protohumans, care for perhaps a small circle of friends and cooperate with them. But it is also a world in which selfinterest and preference for these friends over strangers makes wider cooperation difficult-but not impossible. Again, Darwin (1871, p. 100-101):
As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into larger communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same nation, though personally unknown to him. This point being once reached, there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to the men of all nations and races. If, indeed, such men are separated from him by great differences in appearance or habits, experience unfortunately shews [sic] us how long it is before we look at them as our fellow-creatures. Sympathy beyond the confines of man, that is humanity to the lower animals, seems to be one of the latest moral acquisitions. …This virtue, one of the noblest with which man is endowed, seems to arise incidentally from our sympathies becoming more tender and more widely diffused, until they are extended to all sentient beings. Hume's thesis, which lies at the heart of Darwin's consideration of the origins and development of ethics, is that at the center and base of morality lies our natural tendency to love, care and have sympathy for others and that this is possible because the human being is fundamentally and simultaneously a loving, parochial and selfish being.
Aldo Leopold and the Land Ethic
Aldo Leopold was not a philosopher, nor was he fully an academic, although in sentient beings depended on the other beings' capacity to feel pain. To Darwin the extension depends on our capacity to feel a sense of kinship with those sentient beings.
In the passage quoted above Darwin permits that sympathy can be extended 'beyond the confines of man' to include 'the lower animals' and that this seems to him, to Darwin, to be 'one of the latest moral acquisitions.' Darwin did not propose that any such extension end at this point; he proposed only that it is 'one of the latest' extensions. Leopold's Land Ethic, to quote Leopold now, 'simply enlarges the boundary of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land ' (1949, p. 204) .
The implication of this extension is that a land ethic 'changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it ' (1949, p. 204) . This, in turn, implies 'respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such ' (1949, p. 204) . Leopold insists only that the term community (our community) include among its referents the non-human natural entities-'soils, waters, plants, and animals ' (1949, p. 204 ).
This is a significant break with the Western tradition. It is not simply a prudential extension of a utilitarian version of environmental ethics. It is capturing a reverence-forlife ethic but in holistic way. The reverence-for-life ethic associated with Schweitzer (1923), Goodpaster (1978) and Taylor (1986) is an individualistic ethic. In the hands of
Leopold it is a holistic ethic.
A Living Thing
Our dominant way of looking at the world is mechanistic (Merchant 1980 (Merchant , 1998 (Merchant , 2006 (Merchant , 2008a (Merchant , 2008b Kinsley 1995, Chapter 10; Descartes) . We do not always appreciate the degree and the extent to which we are imprisoned by this metaphor. In Metaphysic of Ethics Kant writes, 'man has no duties imposed upon him, except those owed by him to humanity' and that 'Mankind can … have no duty toward any being other than his fellow-men,' continuing, 'In regard of the BEAUTIFUL [sic] but lifeless objects in nature … ' (1986, p. 258-260) . This passage is part of a discussion of why it is wrong, aesthetically, to wantonly destroy non-human nature. The point here, however, is the unquestioned acceptance that everything other than the animated is, however beautiful, lifeless.
Leopold writes that it is inconceivable that 'an ethical relation to land can exist without love, respect, and admiration for land, and a high regard for its value ' (1949, p. 223), by which Leopold meant intrinsic and not simply instrumental value. How can one love the lifeless? If the biotic community is to be loved, one must emancipate oneself from the mechanical metaphor, indeed a very difficult task. It is a task Leopold accomplished for himself.
In a 1920s essay that remained unpublished until 1979, Leopold explains our ethical issue in characteristic brevity and clarity (Leopold 1979, all quotations are from pages 138-139). He begins, 'A false front of exclusively economic determinism is so habitual to Americans in discussing public questions that one must speak in the language of compound interest to get a hearing.' He goes on to say, 'In past and more outspoken days conservation was put in terms of decency rather than dollars,' and then quotes Ezekiel:
Seemeth it a small thing unto you to have fed upon good pasture, but ye must tread down with your feet the residue of your pasture? And to have drunk of the clear waters, but ye must foul the residue with your feet?
Leopold suggests that in these two sentences 'may be found an epitome of the moral question involved,' further commenting, 'It is possible that Ezekiel respected the soil, not only as a craftsman respects his material, but as a moral being respects a living thing.'
Aware of the pitfalls of language, Leopold continued: 'The very words living thing have an inherited and arbitrary meaning derived not from reality, but from human perceptions of human affairs.' He then tackles our inherited and arbitrary perception of an inanimate, mechanistic nature by quoting the philosopher Ouspensky (1922):
Were we to observe, from the inside, one cubic centimeter of the human body, knowing nothing of the existence of the entire body and of man himself, then the phenomena going on in this little cube of flesh would seem like elemental phenomena in inanimate nature.
Leopold then indicates that Ouspensky suggested, quoting Leopold now,
[I]t is at least not impossible to regard the earth's parts-soil, mountains, rivers, atmosphere, etc.-as organs, of parts of organs, or a coordinated whole, each part of a definite function. And, if we could see this whole, as a whole, through a great period of time, we might perceive not only organs with coordinated functions, but possibly also that process of consumption and replacement which in biology we call the metabolism, or growth. In such a case we would have all the visible attributes of a living thing, which we do not now realize to be such because it is too big, and its life processes too slow. And there would also follow that invisible attribute-a soul, or consciousness-which not only Onpensky
[sic], but many philosophers of all ages, ascribe to all living things and aggregations thereof, including the "dead" earth.
In short, the moral issue to Leopold is that we approach conservation from a strictly economic point of view-and that our economic (as well as scientific) point of view rests, in turn, on a perception of the other-than-human as mechanistic, inanimate and lifeless. Just as utilitarianism has its maxim (the greatest good for the greatest number)
and Kantian ethics has its maxim (act in such a way that you can will that your actions should become a universal law), Leopold, too, distilled a general maxim, an overarching imperative, as a guide to conduct in respect to the environment (1949, p. 224-225 ):
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends to do otherwise.
This maxim is presented in the context of Leopold's discussion of the obstacles that lie in the way of developing a Land Ethic. Chief among those obstacles, 'the 'key-log' which must be moved,' is our habit of 'thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic problem.' Economics determines, in a limiting way, what can be done for land. 'It always has and it always will.' The fallacy that 'economic determinists have tied around our collective neck, and which we now need to cast off, is the belief that economics determines all land-use. This is simply not true.' As Leopold states it (1949, p. 214), a system of conservation based solely on economic self-interest is hopelessly lopsided. It tends to ignore, and thus eventually to eliminate, many elements in the land community that lack commercial value, but that are (as far as we know) essential to its healthy functioning. It assumes, falsely, I think, that the economic parts of the biotic clock will function without the uneconomic parts.
To apply this maxim, to know what preserves and what disrupts the integrity, stability and beauty of a biotic community, requires some degree of ecological literacy, something we do not now have-a point that Leopold, himself, observed and considered to be another major impediment to the evolution of a land ethic.
An Example and Implications for Marketers
Leopold's Land Ethic is opposed to our contemporary push to make the business case for sustainability (to use a contemporary term). Leopold was concerned about this.
In the 1920s piece cited above he wrote, 'one must speak in the language of compound interest to get a hearing.' In other words, one must make the business case to get a hearing. Leopold also addressed this issue in 'The Land Ethic.' Under the heading 'Substitutes for a Land Ethic ' (pp. 210-212) he discusses the 'weakness in a conservation system based wholly on economic motives.' Simply, it is that 'most members of the land community have no economic value.' He suggests that of the '22,000 higher plants and animals native to Wisconsin, it is doubtful whether more than 5 per cent can be sold, fed, eaten, or otherwise put to economic use. Yet these creatures are members of the biotic community and if (as I believe) its stability depends on its integrity, they are entitled to continuance.'
He then discusses wildflowers, songbirds, predatory mammals, raptorial birds, fish-eating birds, certain species of trees and entire biotic communities (marshes, bogs, dunes and deserts). He makes the same point for each: to save them we invent subterfuges to give them economic importance. In the example of songbirds he writes, At the beginning of the century songbirds were supposed to be disappearing.
Ornithologists jumped to the rescue with some distinctly shaky evidence to the effect that insects would eat us up if birds failed to control them. The evidence had to be economic in order to be valid.
If we had a land ethic, an environmental ethic, we would have extended to wildflowers, songbirds, predatory mammals and the rest 'as a matter of biotic right,' the right to simply exist-regardless of the presence or absence of economic advantage to us.
Consider now the contemporary case of the Pacific yew (Taxus brevifoliai), a tree that grows primarily in California, Oregon and Washington (New York Times 1987; Egan 1991; Kolata 1991; Hanson 1992 , Gersmann and Aldred 2011 , Kilham 2013 . It is related to species in England, Western Europe, Russia, China, Japan, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. Of all these species, the Pacific yew is the largest.
It is also one of the slowest growing trees in the world-growing at less than onetenth the rate of the Douglas fir, under the shade of which the Pacific yew grows. The Forest Service classifies the Pacific yew as a weed tree with no value. As such it was typically destroyed as part of traditional clear-cutting forestry practices. After ripping out the yews and all other non-commercial trees in a section, loggers would place them in piles of brush and burn them.
It is not considered endangered species, so why do we talk about this worthless weed tree today? Because in 1961 we discovered it was a potential source of naturally occurring compound that might be used to treat cancer, particularly ovarian cancer and possibly lung cancer. In 1979 it was discovered how the compound, taxol, worked to kill cancer cells and in 1989 it was figured out how to make it soluble (which was necessary to administer it). Promising clinical results then followed. The problem is that it takes six 100-year-old Pacific yews to treat one patient.
Today the business case for the Pacific yew is easy to make. We recognize its potential medicinal uses, its health benefits-and probable profits to be earned. But how would we have made the business case for the Pacific yew in 1960? And how do we make the business case now for the other non-commercial trees ripped out and burned with the yew? If we focused not on the individual trees but on the biotic community as such, and if we gave that biotic community, to which we also belong, the right to exist, we would not have been wantonly burning the yew and other weeds trees just because they had no commercial value. Obligations have no meaning without conscience, and the problem we face is the extension of the social conscience from people to land. …No important change in ethics was ever accomplished without an internal change in our intellectual emphasis, loyalties, affections, and convictions. (pp. 209-210) .
What Leopold says of the farmer we could, and should, say of business today: we have obligations and those obligations have no meaning without conscience. The challenge for marketers is to extend the social conscience from people to the rest of the biotic community.
As conceived by Leopold the land ethic is not about preserving everything in its natural state. It is not about preventing the use of resources (natural capital). He wrote (p. 204), 13 Leopold's concept of conservation is not too far removed from some meanings of our word sustainability. Conservation, he wrote, is our effort to understand and preserve "the capacity of the land for self-renewal (p. 221).
A land ethic of course cannot prevent the alteration, management, and use of these 'resources,' but it does affirm their right to continued existence, and, at least in spots, their continued existence in a natural state.
Conclusions
As I stated above, I do not believe we are ready for an environmental ethic, an ethic that embraces, respects and gives moral consideration to everything and not simply to human beings or to sentient animals. In the meantime, and until we are, we can at least go part way and give moral consideration to some aspects and some components of the non-human natural environment.
Using any of these extended theories for making decisions that impact the environment-and all decisions impact the environment-is far better than not caring about the environment at all or continuing with the presumption that non-human nature is so grand, so huge, that nothing we can have a negative impact. It is, after all, our life support system. Whatever extensionist ethic one is most comfortable accepting, realize that whichever approach one adopts it has deficiencies and difficulties. One must realize, too, that its validity cannot be convincingly demonstrated to those who begin from different presumptions and assumptions.
I leave many questions unanswered. This is in part because of space constraints. It is also because I do not have the answers. The present course of environmental destruction and all its attendant ills is so great that every intellectual tradition, the religious and the secular, is today searching for another approach, one consistent with its To this Leopold would also agree.
